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2 Differences in political inclinations

Today it goes without saying that understanding Russian political identity and such aspects as the preference for authoritarian style of leadership, the consequences of leaders’ aspirations to attain absolute power (including corruption), and political passivity as well as the history of political dissent in Russia is very important for anyone who plans to work and live in a Russian-speaking country.  This understanding is also equally important to those who work with the most recent Russian and Russian-speaking immigrants to the United States.

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Throughout this resource, we use ‘Russian’ and ‘Russian-speaking’ interchangeably, reflecting shared mindsets shaped by common history. This similarity extends to political inclinations and aspects of political identity. However, geopolitical events since 2014, notably Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, have nuanced these inclinations. To acknowledge this nuance, this chapter focuses primarily on the Russian history and its effect on the Russian political mindset.

Historical explanations for the preference for autocracy

Understanding the Russian mindset is incomplete without discussing aspects of the Russian national political identity, significantly shaped by the nation’s history. Historically, both Russian politicians and the general population have shown a preference for autocracy, where one person holds absolute power. This preference is not merely anecdotal but a fact: many Russians and Russian-speaking people believe in the power of “a strong/firm hand” (сильная рука), a leadership style characterized by strong, centralized authority and decisive, often authoritarian governance. While this might change in the future, the current inclination towards autocratic leadership remains strong among Russians. Russian leaders—from the Tsardom to the Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and modern Russia—have exemplified the “strong hand” approach, aspiring to absolute power. Absolute power means one leader holds complete and unrestricted authority over the government and its institutions. This approach is often justified by the need for stability following turbulent periods and the perpetual quest for geopolitical security, whether real or perceived. 

To the Western mindset, it might be surprising that countries with authoritarian regimes have and proclaim the same democratic institutions, structures, procedures, and liberties. However, in these contexts, familiar concepts such as laws, constitutions, and elections do not carry the same weight or significance as they do in the Western world. When absolute power is held by a single person, laws and governmental institutions become tools for reinforcing that power rather than serving as instruments for regulating society. Over time, this dynamic undermines the perception of laws as fair and just mechanisms, emphasizing other factors as equally, if not more, influential than the law. This historical context has deeply influenced the Russian political mindset, shaping a national identity that simultaneously acknowledges the existence of laws while often viewing them as flexible or secondary to other considerations. Similarly, as the collectivist mindset allows personal connections to outweigh set procedures, the tendency to accept authoritarian regimes places the leader’s persona above the law.

Attitudes to laws and official regulations

Although Russia has laws and people do follow them on a regular basis, there exists an overarching belief that laws are not of paramount importance. This belief originates from the notion that laws can be altered at the discretion of those in power, leading to a lack of reliance on legal structures. It is further believed that laws may be applied selectively, targeting specific groups rather than the general population. This disbelief (and sometimes disregard) for the power of the law manifests on both grand and minor scales. On a large scale, most people in Russia do not take legal changes seriously, partly due to a lack of political literacy and the idea that the person in power is above the law. On a smaller scale—whether in business or individual matters—people do not worry about specific regulations if they believe they can find someone in charge who can turn a blind eye (“закрыть глаза”) to specific violations, either as a personal favor or for a bribe. For instance, it is somewhat common knowledge that it is easier to bribe a road police officer in Russia for a speeding violation than to go through the proper procedures of paying a fine. While this system is changing, it remains a widespread practice in various administrative situations.

Once someone attains absolute power, maintaining it becomes crucial by surrounding themselves with loyal and obedient individuals. Financial incentives play a significant role in securing this loyalty. Those who align themselves with the power structure and demonstrate absolute loyalty often gain more power and financial benefits. This intertwining of financial gain and political allegiance highlights the motives of many politicians in Russia, who may be more focused on personal enrichment than public service. It is essential to note that not every Russian politician fits this mold, but these tendencies are prevalent enough to shape the overall political landscape.

Political passivity of the population

Loyalty and obedience are paramount in securing absolute power, and this push for loyalty extends beyond politics to various aspects of society with pronounced power hierarchy, whether in a university, company, or family. The widespread acceptance of absolute power and its characteristics also leads to another phenomenon that may be challenging for foreigners, especially Westerners, to grasp: the general population often voluntarily submits to authority. This subordination is deeply ingrained, reflecting cultural norms rather than coerced behavior. Among the general population, this dynamic of voluntary subordination to authority, fostered through centuries of established absolute power, leads to a passive and apolitical mindset often mentioned in the context of Russian politics.

Even though the political passivity of the Russian people seems voluntary, it results from centuries of adjusting to the system of absolute power—whether as a tsardom, empire, or communist regime. When someone rises to political power, they do everything to preserve their status by any means necessary. One thing absolute power cannot coexist with is widespread criticism. Consequently, cracking down on opposition becomes a standard approach for politicians, who prefer to suppress dissent rather than address underlying issues. Historically, individuals who spoke out faced severe repercussions, gradually leading to a collective reluctance to voice dissent. Over time, this reluctance solidified into passivity as a means of self-preservation. Alongside this, restricting freedom of speech further supports maintaining absolute power. By limiting criticism and employing propaganda to demonstrate absolute agreement with the status quo, an illusion of widespread support is created, reinforcing the authority of those in power.

Limited criticism is an aspect of any authoritarian system, and the more controlled the society, the more passivity can be seen in reacting to current events. It is important to note that some criticism will always be present in such societies even among the subordinate part of the population, but interestingly it often will not target the main person in charge. Throughout Russian history, there has been a strong connection between the state and the church, which consistently supported the notion of the divinity of Russian czars, promoting the idea that the sovereign was God’s appointed ruler. The faith in a “good tsar” gradually became a distinctive feature of the Russian mindset: it is a belief that the ruler is inherently infallible, and issues or crises are often attributed to the advisors or officials surrounding the rulers, rather than the rulers themselves. This shift of blame and criticism away from the main person in charge is crucial to understanding the attitudes of the Russian people towards their leaders, as this historical perspective continues to influence contemporary views and political dynamics in Russia today.  Even today, the enduring faith in the president’s infallibility, bolstered by historical and cultural factors as well as active propaganda, often redirects blame away from the president and towards other figures within the administration. This mindset is unique in that people support the idea of a “strong hand” that wields significant—if not absolute—power but is free from any fault.

Another consequence of absolute power being the most common type of leadership style in Russia throughout the centuries is a notable tolerance of corruption, rooted in a general understanding of how power dynamics operate. It is widely acknowledged and accepted that politicians often seek power for financial gain. Consequently, Russians tend to be more accepting of this reality compared to other cultures. When Alexei Navalny and his team began publishing investigations into mass corruption in Putin’s Russia, they anticipated a more significant impact. While these investigations inspired many people to look at Russian politics differently, they did not make a strong statistical impact on the population. Even Navalny’s investigation into Putin’s palace and the astonishing amount of tax money spent on it did not have the expected effect. Tolerance of corruption in Russian culture is a conditional trait, though, and depends on the perceived standard of living. There is an unspoken social contract between the population and the leadership: the population “allows” the leadership freedom to use power for financial gain as long as the overall standard of living is perceived as good or good enough. Having suffered through turbulent historical periods repeatedly, people have learned to value stability—the lack of changes to the current standing—the most, no matter what the price.


Political dissent in Russia

Despite the inclination for tolerance of power abuse and lack of mass protests, political dissent has a long and complex history in all forms of Russian statehood: the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and, most recently, modern Russia. Historically, dissent often came from intellectual circles, with figures like Alexander Herzen and the Decembrists pushing for political reform and social justice. This also included poets and writers like Joseph Brodsky and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as well as scientists like Andrei Sakharov. The totalitarian regime of the Communist Party did not tolerate dissent or criticism of any kind; the KGB and other services used extensive surveillance, censorship, and brutal repression to silence political opposition in the Soviet Union. Speaking out against the Communist Party, its representatives, or its ideology often led to exile, imprisonment, or execution.

The era of glasnost and perestroika under Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s briefly allowed for more open criticism, which blossomed during the 1990s under Boris Yeltsin. The 1990s saw an explosion of media outlets and a greater degree of freedom of expression. Journalists seized the opportunity to investigate and report on issues that were previously off-limits, including government corruption, organized crime, and abuses of power. Key figures like Anna Politkovskaya emerged during this time, known for her fearless reporting on human rights abuses, particularly in Chechnya. Publications such as “Novaya Gazeta” gained prominence for their in-depth investigative pieces. In modern Russia, political dissent has once again become a hot topic. Gradually closing all media publications that followed the 90s model of objective investigative journalism, Putin’s regime gave way to a new era of the dissident movement in Russia after his government began stifling opposition through harassment, media control, and imprisoning prominent oppositional figures. This process especially intensified after February 2022, when any form of disagreement with the war in Ukraine became grounds for arrest on various counts, including extremism. Most prominent Russian opposition figures are either dead, like Boris Nemtsov and Alexei Navalny, or imprisoned, like Ilya Yashin*, and Vladimir Kara-Murza*, or in exile, like Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Garry Kasparov. Thousands of people, as young as 15 and as old as 80, are serving prison terms for voicing their opposition to the war in peaceful ways.

*both Yashin and Kara-Murza were released as part of the prisoner swap on August 1, 2024.

Russia is sometimes referred to as a country of extremes because political passivity can change very rapidly when patience and acceptance of the abuse of power by the authorities reach their limits. When living standards start declining, the unspoken social contract is broken and patience reaches a breaking point, and perceived passivity can swiftly evolve into intense, often brutal revolt. This dramatic shift from apathy to revolution is a characteristic aspect of Russian history. The famous Russian poet Alexander Pushkin encapsulated this trait in his often-quoted phrase, “God save us from seeing a Russian revolt, senseless and merciless.” This quote underscores the violent nature of uprisings in Russian history, which are rarely peaceful once they erupt.